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Abstract
We show that an asymptotic envy-freeness is a necessary condition for a form of
robust approximate implementation in large economies.
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1 Introduction
The idea that competition leads to eÆciency is central to economics. As economies come
in many forms and there are many eÆcient allocations to choose from, it is important
have a deep understanding of how far one can push such ideas. The First Welfare
Theorem tells us that Walrasian allocations are very well behaved in classical economies
with private goods and private ownership of production. However, once we look to other
settings and other allocation rules, often the basic insights that underlie the First Welfare
Theorem can no longer be applied and the answers are not so clear. Nevertheless, there
are many situations where we still might believe that if large numbers of small agents
interact then we should be able to implement eÆcient allocations. So, what exactly is
it that denes the situations where this is true? Or more to the point, what conditions
identify the settings and social choice functions that we can approximately implement in
a large economy?
In this note, we provide a very simple and intuitive answer to the above question. We
show that in a wide variety of settings any social choice function that is approximately
implementable in large economies (in a strong sense to be made precise) must be asymp-
totically envy-free. Foley's (1967) property of envy-freeness states that no agent should
wish to swap allocations with another agent. The envy-free property is one with a strong
normative appeal that has served as the foundation of notions of \fairness." The relation-
ship between this fairness condition and incentives in large economies is embarrassingly
simple. It comes in two parts. First, if a social choice function is approximately imple-
mented in a large economy, then it must satisfy an incentive compatibility constraint so
that an agent will not pretend to be of another type. Second, approximate implementa-
tion requires that in a large enough economy any single agent's announcement will not
have much eect on the overall allocation. This means that an agent can obtain almost
the same allocation as some other agent by pretending to be of the same type as that
other agent. Putting these together we can conclude that an agent does not wish to swap

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allocations with any other agent in the limit and hence the limiting allocation must be
(asymptotically) envy-free.
Beyond envy-freeness being a necessary condition for approximate implementability
in large economies, it is in some cases suÆcient. We describe a simple variation on a
folk-mechanism which provides for approximate implementation of envy-free social choice
functions in settings where goods are excludable (thus all private goods and some public
goods settings). In the case of non-excludable goods other approaches are necessary.
We describe a mechanism that works if certain monotonicity assumptions hold but leave
open the question of whether envy-freeness is suÆcient for implementation in the most
general framework.
Relation to the Literature
As the question of which allocations are implementable in large economies is funda-
mental to economics, there are many previous investigations that have shed light on it.
Let us mention the most closely related parts of the literature.
To start with, there is a literature that investigates the implementability of the Wal-
rasian correspondence. That literature has looked at small and large economies, complete
and incomplete information, full and approximate implementation, and direct and indi-
rect mechanisms. A short summary of some of the main conclusions is as follows. While
there are diÆculties in implementingWalrasian equilibria in small economies (unless there
is complete information), approximating the equilibria in large economies is possible.
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Once one moves beyond Walrasian equilibria in a private good exchange economy, the
picture is more pessimistic. There is a large literature on mechanisms for the provision
of public goods, and there it is also clear (perhaps even clearer) that incentives are a
critical issue. However, in public goods settings having large numbers of agents does not
necessarily help with incentives. In fact, it can hurt (as shown by Mailath and Postlewaite
(1990) and Al-Najjar and Smorodinsky (2000)). The idea there is that in a large economy
an agent's announcement has very little chance of inuencing the public good decision,
and thus agents worry mainly about how their announcement aects their share of the
1
The seminal reference is Hurwicz (1972). A key references on implementation of the Walrasian cor-
respondence under complete information is Hurwicz, Maskin and Postlewaite (1995). Impossibility with
small numbers and incomplete information is established in Blume and Easley (1983) and Palfrey and
Srivastava (1986). Careful investigation of incentives in large exchange economies began with Roberts
and Postlewaite (1976) who showed the gains from manipulation of Walrasian allocations shrink as the
economy is replicated. Jackson (1992) and Gul and Postlewaite (1992) showed that in fact the direct
Walrasian mechanism is dominant strategy incentive compatible in large economies with a nite set
of types. However, the direct mechanism turns out to have problems without the nite type assump-
tion unless some belief restrictions are imposed, as pointed out by Thomson (1979), Otani and Sicilian
(1982, 1990) and Jackson and Manelli (1996). If one insists on dominant strategies then even indirect
mechanisms will be signicantly ineÆcient in large economies, as shown by Barbera and Jackson (1995).
However, as shown by Cordoba and Hammond (1998) and Kovalenkov (2002), some nice approximate
implementation results can be recovered if one loosens the balance constraints and works with some
clever indirect mechanisms.
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cost. Such large economy results on public goods can be obtained as an easy corollary of
the envy-free result, as we point out below. Envy-freeness directly implies that all costs
must be the same as agents have the same allocation in public goods.
2
McLean and Postlewaite (2002) is probably the most closely related work in terms
of the spirit of trying to uncover the conditions that characterize approximate imple-
mentability in large economies.
3
Their main result is that in pure exchange economies
if agents are all \informationally small," then essentially any social choice function can
be approximately implemented in the limit. Thus, they are pointing to the fact that no
agent should have information that remains essential in the limit, as the dening feature
of approximate implementability. The notion of envy-freeness never pops up in their
analysis. Let us explain why this is the case. In their setting, uncertainty regards the
\characteristics" of goods, and not individuals' preferences over the goods. In particular,
in their setting under informational smallness - if you know the information of all but
one agent and the economy large enough then you know with arbitrary accuracy what
that remaining agent's preferences are. That denition of informational smallness is a
strong one, as it precludes agents from having any private information about their own
preferences. This is the critical dierence, as it is such private information that is the
key to implying envy-freeness, and we shall discuss the condition is vacuously satised
otherwise.
Finally, let us point out that there are two conditions in the way we dene social
choice functions and implementability that play a role in our results. First, we only
consider social choice functions satisfying the well-known \equal treatment of equals"
property. This is built directly into our denition of social choice function and is the
requirement that if agents dier only in their name and not in any observable or reported
characteristics, then they should receive the same allocation.
4
It is a very minimal
anonymity condition. Clearly, if a social choice function always gives everything to agent
1, just because she is named agent 1, then that will be implementable and envious.
We rule such social choice functions out by at. Of course, we do allow the social choice
function to depend on what agents announce, and also on other observable characteristics
which might be things like the agent's endowment, age, whether they are buyers or sellers,
or some pre-existing rights that they have.
The other condition in our denitions that plays a role is the \robustness" of the
implementation. This requires that the implementation work even when agents happen
to learn extra information about the common state beyond what they know from their
type. This condition plays a subtle but important role in our results. In the absence of
2
Note that this is true even under excludability, provided the allocation is eÆcient.
3
Gul and Postlewaite (1992) and Jackson (1992) are perhaps a bit closer to our work in formulation,
as they allow for some private aspect to values. However, the motivation of those papers is less in the
line of identifying general conditions for implementability. Note also that both of those papers work
with variations on Walrasian allocations and so envy-freeness is automatically satised.
4
In our case, this is required from an interim perspective, and identical agents may be receiving
random allocations whose ex post realizations might still dier.
3
such a condition an implementing mechanism can take very strong advantage of small
dierences in agents' expectations about the state to get them to completely separate
themselves. This is the insight that underlies approaches such as that of Cremer and
McLean (1988). Such mechanisms, however, are very sensitive to the exact specication
of the prior and the agents' information sets. Requiring robustness is a step towards the
practical in that it requires a mechanism still perform in situations where agents, either
by accident or by their choice, have more information than we presume. This robustness
beyond being desirable (and perhaps necessary in practice) is important in deriving envy-
freeness. The ability of one agent to pretend to be of another's type is needed to derive
envy-freeness and can be prevented if one can rely on non-robust mechanisms where
slight dierences in information are exploited.
2 Denitions
Agents and Economies
There are countably many agents, who are indexed by i 2 IN .
We index economies by n indicating the number of agents in the economy, where
economy n consists of the rst n agents, f1; : : : ; ng :
Uncertainty, Types, and Information
Agents have two dierent sorts of characteristics. Some are openly observable and
others are private information. For example, it may be that an agent's age or endowment
is observable and that the agent's preferences are private information.
In addition to the potential observed and unobserved heterogeneity of agents, we also
wish to have the model allow for some commonality in preferences and payos. To this
end, a specication of the economy includes a proles of the agents' public labels, their
private types, and a state of nature.
 L is the set of labels, and `
i
2 L denotes agent i's label.
 T is the set of types, and t
i
2 T denotes agent i's type.
 S is the set of states of the world, and the realized state is denoted by s 2 S.
So, again, `
i
2 L is interpreted as being the publicly observable characteristics of
agent i that we call the agent's \label", t
i
2 T is the agent's private information that
we call the agent's \type", and s 2 S is a state of nature that can enter into all agents'
preferences.
4
Depending on the setting and application, what falls into L and what falls into T
may vary. For instance, in one application it may be that endowments are observable
and preferences are not. In another it may be that neither endowments nor preferences
are observable. In yet another application it may be some skill or income that is not
observable, while preferences are known.
We make several assumptions on the spaces and the uncertainty.
1. To simplify the exposition we assume that L, T , and S are nite.
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2. A probability distribution p on S describes the uncertainty on s, where p(s) is the
probability of state s 2 S. Types are i.i.d. conditional on the agent's label and the
state according to a family of conditional probability measures p(js; `
i
) dened on
T . So, p(t
i
js; `
i
) is the probability that an agent is of type t
i
2 T conditional on
the state being s and the agent's label being `
i
.
3. Finally, we assume that the proportion of agents of having dierent labels is well-
dened in the limiting economy. That is, for each l 2 L there exists q(l) 2 [0; 1]
such that
jfi  nj`
i
= lgj
n
! q (l)
Without loss of generality, let q (l) > 0 for all l 2 L.
Note that we are treating labels as given and not uncertain. This is because we
assume that they are observable, and so we can think of everything conditional on their
realization. A trivial extension would treat them as uncertain without any changes to
our results below.
Allocations and Preferences
A
n
 IR
(n+1)k
is the set of feasible allocations for economy n, where k is some positive
integer.
An allocation a
n
2 A
n
contains both public and private parts. We write a
n
=
(a
n
0
; a
n
1
; : : : ; a
n
n
), with the interpretation that a
n
0
is public and may enter any agent's
preferences while a
n
i
is something that is private to agent i. This is essentially without
loss of generality.
Allocations may be quite general, including public goods, private goods, rules, etc.
Let A
0
= [
n
A
n
0
, A
i
= [
n
A
n
i
, and A = [
n
A
n
.
5
As mentioned in footnote 1 above, distinctions between nite and innite spaces in such analyses
can sometimes be important. In this case it is fairly clear that our results extend to the innite case,
provided some appropriate compactness and continuity conditions are imposed.
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It is possible for the set of feasible allocations to depend on agents' labels. However,
we require that A
i
= A
j
whenever `
i
= `
j
.
Agents evaluate allocations according to a function u : A
0
 A
i
 S  L  T ! IR
so that u (a
0
; a
i
; s; `
i
; t
i
) denotes the utility of allocation a
0
; a
i
to an agent of label `
i
and
type t
i
in state s.
Having a common u across agents is without loss of generality, as any idiosyncratic
aspect of preferences can be built encoded in t
i
and `
i
.
Given an allocation a, state s and a type t
i
of agent i, we write u
i
(a; s; t
i
) to denote
u (a
0
; a
i
; s; `
i
; t
i
).
We assume that u is bounded and continuous.
Note that most any economy of interest ts into our setting, including exchange
economies, production economies, economies with (excludable or non-excludable) public
goods, economies with club goods, commons problems, etc.
Social Choice Functions
A social choice function on an economy n is a function f : S  T
n
! A
n
, such that
that `
i
= `
j
and t
i
= t
j
implies that a
i
= a
j
.
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Note that a social choice function does not take labels as an argument. That is
because we treat the labels as known and given, and so the social choice function already
can be made to depend on labels.
We build into the denition of a social choice function that it must treat identical
agents (in terms of both labels and types) equally.
7
This still allows agents with dif-
ferent labels, say buyers and sellers, or agents with dierent endowments, to be treated
dierently.
Envy-Freeness
A social choice function f on economy n is "-envy-free if for every i and j in f1; : : : ; ng
such that `
i
= `
j
u(a
n
0
; a
n
i
; `
i
; t
i
; s)  u(a
n
0
; a
n
j
; `
i
; t
i
; s)  "
6
We may wish to allow for random allocations. This is already admitted under our formulation
of the allocation space which lies in a Euclidean space, and u can be an evaluation of expected (or
non-expected) utility.
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Note that this only needs to hold from the interim perspective. That is, if a
i
is a random allocation,
it simply requires that the distribution over allocations be the same for identical agents, while ex-post
they may be treated dierently.
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for almost every s and t, where a
n
= f
n
(s; t
n
):
Epsilon envy-freeness implies that an agent does not envy the allocation of agents
who have the same label by more than some minimal amount. We emphasize that this
only applies across agents with the same label.
A sequence of social choice functions ff
n
g is asymptotically envy-free if for every
" > 0 there exists N such that f
n
is " envy-free for all for n > N and i  n.
Incentive Compatibility and Implementability
A social choice function f on economy n is incentive compatible if it does not depend
on s and satises
E [u
i
(f(t
 i
; t
i
); t
i
; s)jt
i
]  E
h
u
i
(f(t
 i
;
b
t
i
); t
i
; s)jt
i
i
;
for all i, t
i
, and
b
t
i
.
The denition of incentive compatibility requires that f depend only on t, but not on
s.
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So, this requires that the social choice function only involve information that can be
obtained through the actions or reports of the agents as well as their observable labels -
but does not require an omniscient social planner who knows the state.
A social choice function f
n
is robustly incentive compatible if it does not depend on
s and satises
E [u
i
(f
n
(t
 i
; t
i
); t
i
; s)jt
i
; s]  E
h
u
i
(f
n
(t
 i
;
b
t
i
); t
i
; s)jt
i
; s
i
for all i, t
i
, s, and
b
t
i
.
Robust incentive compatibility requires incentive compatibility even in the case where
an agent happens to learn the common part of the state of the world s. Note that this
is still substantially weaker than ex-post incentive compatibility, as this says nothing
about what an agent knows regarding other agents' types - other than the distribution
over them - and the social choice function depends only on the agents' types not the
state of the world. For instance, in an independent private values world, robust incentive
compatibility is exactly equivalent to incentive compatibility. It is very minimal way of
ensuring that a mechanism is not sensitive to extra information that agents might learn
or might have an incentive to learn. The important aspect of this robust form of incentive
compatibility is that it precludes the mechanism from taking advantage of very specic
aspects of the correlation structure of uncertainty and hence rules out mechanisms such
as those in Cremer and McLean (1988).
8
As already pointed out, f can depend on the labels `
i
as those are given and known.
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Implementability
A sequence of social choice functions ff
n
g is robustly approximately implementable
9
if there exists a sequence of robustly incentive compatible f
b
f
n
g so that for each i
(
b
f
n
0
;
b
f
n
i
)  (f
n
0
; f
n
i
) ! 0 in probability
Note that the implemented social choice functions can depend on s, while the social
choice functions which approximate them can only depend on information obtained from
the agents. The idea is that through information obtained from the agents, the state can
be estimated and so the implementing social choice functions can come to approximate
ones which know the state.
A sequence of social choice functions ff
n
g is convergent if there exists f : SLT !
A
0
 [
i
A
i
(written f = (f
0
; f
1
)) such that
(f
n
0
; f
n
i
)[s; t
n
]! (f
0
(s) ; f
1
(s; `
i
; t
i
)) in probability
for each i.
A convergent sequence of social choice functions is one that has a well-dened limiting
allocation as a function of the state and agent's labels and types.
3 Envy-Freeness as a Necessary Condition
We now state the main result.
Theorem 1 A convergent sequence of social choice functions is robustly approximately
implementable only if it is asymptotically envy-free.
Proof of Theorem 1: Given is a convergent sequence of social choice functions ff
n
g
with limit f that is robustly approximately implemented by the sequence f
b
f
n
g.
We say that the limit f is robustly incentive compatible if for each s, `
i
, t
i
and t
0
i
u(f
0
(s) ; f
1
(s; `
i
; t
i
) ; `
i
; s; t
i
)  u(f
0
(s) ; f
1
(s; `
i
; t
0
i
) ; `
i
; s; t
i
)
The theorem follows from Lemmas 2, 3 and 4.
Lemma 2 If a convergent sequence ff
n
g with limit f is robustly approximately imple-
mented by the sequence f
b
f
n
g, then f
b
f
n
g is also convergent with limit f .
9
Note that we are using the term implementable in a weak sense in that we are working only with
incentive compatibility and not making claims about the full set of equilibria of a mechanism.
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Lemma 3 If a convergent sequence f
b
f
n
g is robustly incentive compatible then so is its
limit f .
Lemma 4 Consider a convergent sequence ff
n
g of social functions. Its limit f is ro-
bustly incentive compatible if and only if the sequence ff
n
g is asymptotically envy-free.
The proofs of the lemmas appear in the appendix.
A simple application of Theorem 1 is to a public good problem. Consider a society
deciding on whether to undertake a costly public project. Agents dier only in the util-
ity they receive from the project and this utility is private information. An immediate
corollary of Theorem 1 is that any allocation for large economies which is robustly ap-
proximately implementable must have all agents pay the same cost, and so a convergent
sequence of social choice functions is robustly approximately implementable only if the
cost allocations of agents are identical. This implies that without external nancing the
public project, if individual rationality constraints are imposed then the project is never
built in the limit, which is as shown in Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) and Al-Najjar
and Smorodinsky (2000)).
4 Envy-Freeness as a SuÆcient Condition
Let us briey describe what we know about the suÆciency of envy-freeness for imple-
mentability.
Excludable Goods
In an excludable goods setting, A
0
is a singleton. In addition to private goods settings,
this admits public goods where agents can be excluded from consuming the public good.
In this case envy-freeness is a suÆcient condition for robust approximate implementation.
The idea behind this is simple although the details are quite complex. There is a class
of \folk" mechanisms for implementation that adapt easily to excludable-good settings.
Randomly pick
p
n agents from the population. Given the excludability, we can ensure
that the allocations of these agents are constant across their announcements and so
truth is robustly incentive compatible for them. From that sample, with large enough
n we learn the state s with arbitrarily high probability. To the remaining agents, we
oer a menu based on f(s; `
i
; ), which given the envy-freeness will be robustly incentive
compatible and will approximate the desired social choice functions for large enough n
with high probability.
The diÆcult details regarding making the above heuristic description of a mechanism
into a formal statement involve making sure that, for instance, the allocation is at least
feasible or perhaps even budget balanced. There are various approaches to dealing with
9
balance problems in large economy mechanisms, and since they have been well-studied in
the context of exchange economies and extend readily here, we simply refer the interested
reader to Cordoba and Hammond (1998) and Kovalenkov (2002) for details.
Non-excludable (Public) Goods
In situations where we cannot exclude agents from enjoying some goods, the type
of mechanism described above is no longer applicable since the sampled agents' incen-
tives are no longer so clear. It is easy to see that some additional conditions will be
needed to ensure implementability. For instance, consider a pure public good setting
with a binary public good decision (e.g., pass a new law or not), and where there are
no transfers available, and agents might like or dislike the project. Any social choice
function is necessarily envy-free since the allocation is purely public, and yet there is no
way to implement a social choice function that chooses the decision that maximizes total
utility (as for instance, agents will exaggerate their like or dislike for the good). In some
cases where transfers are possible, one can construct robust implementing mechanisms of
envy-free functions. With some nice single- crossing properties and under some specic
distributional assumptions, we can charge agents for announcing higher types in propor-
tion to the chance that their announcement turns out to be pivotal in the decision. These
dierential payments across types disappear in the limit and so we obtain envy-freeness.
The question of the full necessary and suÆcient conditions for robust approximate im-
plementation in the case where some goods are non-excludable is a diÆcult one that we
leave open.
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6 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2: This follows from the niteness of the state and type spaces, which
give us uniform convergence of both sequences.
Proof of Lemma 3: Consider a convergent sequence f
b
f
n
g that is robustly incentive
compatible. It follows that
E
h
u(
b
f
n
0
(t
 i
; t
i
);
b
f
n
i
(t
 i
; t
i
); t
i
; s)js; t
i
i
 E
h
u(
b
f
n
0
(t
 i
; t
0
i
);
b
f
n
i
(t
 i
; t
0
i
); t
i
; s)js; t
i
i
(1)
Observe that not only
b
f
n
0
(t
 i
; t
i
) but also
b
f
n
0
(t
 i
; t
0
i
) converges to f
0
(s) in probability.
That is, in the limit if an agent misrepresents his type he does not change the public part
of the allocation. To see this we consider
b
f
n
0
(t
 i
; t

) for some xed type t

: Conditional
on the state being s there is a positive probability that t
i
= t

. Hence, the fact that
b
f
n
0
(t
 i
; t
i
) converges to f
0
(s) in probability implies that also
b
f
n
0
(t
 i
; t

) converges to
f
0
(s) in probability.
Since for any s and `
i
, t
i
,
(
b
f
n
0
;
b
f
n
i
)[s; t
n
 i
; t
i
]! f
0
(s) ; f
1
(s; `
i
; t
i
) in probability;
it follows that that for any t
0
i
(
b
f
n
0
;
b
f
n
i
)[s; t
n
 i
; t
0
i
]! f
0
(s) ; f
1
(s; `
i
; t
0
i
) in probability:
Since u is continuous and bounded, given the robust incentive compatibility of the se-
quence, the claim then follows from (1).
Proof of Lemma 4: First, suppose that ff
n
g is asymptotically envy-free but that f is
not robustly incentive compatible so that there is some s, `
i
, t
i
and t
0
i
, and "

such that
u(f
0
(s) ; f
1
(s; `
i
; t
i
) ; `
i
; s; t
i
) < u(f
0
(s) ; f (s; `
i
; t
0
i
) ; `
i
; s; t
i
)  "

:
Since p (t
0
i
js; `
i
) > 0 and since q (`
i
) > 0 we can almost surely nd a j so that `
j
= `
i
and t
j
= t
0
i
: This leads to a contradiction of asymptotic envy-freeness as f
n
j
(s; t
 j
; t
j
)!
f
1
(s; `
i
; t
0
i
) (in probability, independently of t
i
) and f
n
i
(s; `
i
; t
 i
; t
i
) ! f
1
(s; `
i
; t
i
) (in
probability, independently of t
j
), and so j will envy i by a xed amount, even for large
n.
Next consider the converse. Suppose that f is robustly incentive compatible, but ff
n
g
is not asymptotically envy-free. Since L, S and T are nite, we can nd s, `
i
, t
i
and an
"

so that for arbitrary large n, some agent i who has label `
i
and type t
i
envies another
agent j of type t
j
where `
j
= `
i
by more than "

:
u(f
n
0
(s; t); f
n
i
(s; t); `
i
; t
i
; s) < u(f
n
0
(s; t); f
n
j
(s; t); `
i
; t
i
; s)  "

f
n
being convergent to f implies that:
ff
n
0
(s; t
 i
; t
j
) ; f
n
i
(s; t
 i
; t
j
)g ! (f
0
(s) ; f
1
(s; `
i
; t
j
)) in probability:
Hence, a contradiction of robust incentive compatibility of the limit f follows, noting
that u is bounded and continuous.
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